
24 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Fitts

SUBJECT:

TOD - Part II

- 1. I am returning Part II with some proposed changes beginning on page 3. Attached is a proposed redraft of Section B. Proposed changes of some of the specific questions appear in the draft text.
- 2. I believe that we should take III. out entirely. For one thing, we have been working the COMINT programs over in a number of different connections, e.g., base reductions, Frosting, the CCP generally, etc., etc. Another point, however, is that it seems to me that these questions should be premised on whatever inference is legitimately suggested by the figures themselves. The fact that COMINT processing accounts for 70% of all processing resources creates a legitimate inference that this is a field worthy of investigation. The question as now drafted, however, goes further and suggests that increases in communications security, for example, are a reason for a critical examination of the program. This strikes me as an entirely extraneous factor which is not apparent from the examination of the TOD as such, and therefore not legitimately a part of our presentation.



Attachment

25X1

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DRAFT: JABROSS: ag (24/7/68)

B. My Section B = Significant Questions

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One of the major objectives of the TOD is to identify areas or activities which deserve, for one reason or another, separate study and evaluation. It should be obvious, however, that the TOD itself provides no basis for the formulation of qualitative judgements. In and of themselves the data and figures compiled in a resource presentation of this character throw little if any light on the question of whether and to what degree resources serve actual intelligence needs and priorities.

A. The TOD does disclose where resources are concentrated and what the emphasis of the intelligence effort is. It thus serves as an indicator for those charged with responsibilities for intelligence programs of possible imbalances in the allocation of resources or of excessive or inadequate attention to particular targets.

3. Our preliminary review of the current TOD information hase and data display for FY 67 and FY 68 highlights a number of questions, which for the most part have been under active review for a number of years, concerning the focus and mix of U.S. intelligence efforts.

4. Six very general areas have tentatively been identified for questions, as a result of this first review. In singling these areas out for further attention, it is not necessarily meant to suggest that the application of new and additional procedures, outside those presenter

3. w Jehren War existing for the review and evaluation of programs and requirements, is necessary or desirable. Institutional arrangements have been developed over the past few years for the provision of general guicance concerning the level of effort and resource development most appropriate to meet intelligence needs. In most cases questions suggested by the TOD can be adequately answered through these established channels. In certain circumstances, however, ad hoc arrangements for the examination of particularly complex or important problem areas may be justified.

Such problem areas can, as appropriate, be made the subject of special studies which emphasize the use of systems or operational analysis techniques.

5. As just one example, the question whether improvements planned for imagery sensors have been adequately related to intelligence needs is in fact suggested by the figures. It should be recognized, however, that an enormous amount of time and effort has been committed over the past four years by USIB through COMIREX working jointly with the NRO to develop precisely this interaction between resource needs and intelligence planning. Periodic re-examination of the validity of USIB guidance and NRO planning in this connection is of course essential. This can be accomplished through the normal USIB mechanism. It would be uncealistic, moreover, to expect further probing to throw much new light on this area or lead to any revolutionary change in the program. Perhaps

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programs lies in the value to be derived from a review of the total mix of intelligence systems arrayed against a particular target. A clinical examination of this mix, based on a systems analysis study, may suggest, for example, redundancies of coverage which could lead to decision soo reduce or eliminate requirements for coverage by overhead photographic systems on the grounds that adequate information is obtainable from,

2-3 paus

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